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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
under the 1934 Act's general anti.fraud section, might prompt it to
re-evaluate the purchaser-seller rule in view of the recognized injury to
issuer and shareholder alike resulting from false Williams Act filings. 46
AN EXCHANGE PURSUANT TO A MERGER- NOT A 16(b) SALE
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Section 16(b) 47 of the Securities Exchange Act of 198448 provides
that a corporation may recover from a statutory insider 49 any profit
made on its stock which is sold within six months of purchase. Despite
an ostensibly clear purpose of preventing insiders from using their
status to acquire information that will enable them to realize specula-
tive profits through short-swing trading in the equity securities of their
corporations, the section has had "both a litigious and controversial
history."50
In Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,5 1 the Second Circuit
was required to decide whether a tender offeror who derives a substan-
tial profit from a defensive merger by the target corporation should be
subject to section 16(b) liability. In exempting two profitable trans-
actions, the court found no possibility for speculative abuse in appel-
potentially unlimited liability, it is submitted that such proof problems ought
not to be considered at the outset on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing to
sue.
Kellogg, supra note 35, at 116.
46 See note 40 supra.
47 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 amended the
Securities Act of 1934 and, for purposes of analysis, can be divided into two parts.
The main feature of [the first] portion is an extension of the registration, periodic
reporting, proxy and insider trading provisions of sections 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the
Exchange Act to larger over-the-counter companies. These provisions were formerly
applicable only to listed companies.... The second part of the act deals primarily
with broker-dealers in securities and their personnel. It imposes upon such persons
increased qualifications standards, as well as strengthened and refined administrative
discplinary controls.
R. PhilAps and M. Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
1964 DuI. LJ. 706-07 (1964), These amendments "constitute the most significant items of
federal securities legislation since" 1940. Id. at 706.
49 The term statutory insider applies to any
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum
of any class of any equity (other than an exempted security) which is registered
pursuant to [section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], or who is a director
or an officer of the issuer of such security.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
50 Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for Clarifi-
cation, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 772 (1971) [hereinafter Bateman]. The author, in tracing the
development of the current pragmatic interpretation of section 16(b) indicates that while
most cases adopting this interpretive method have been clear in pointing out that 16(b)
should be interpreted in the light of its purposes, these same courts have not been clear
in discerning exactly what those purposes are, Despite an ostensible clarity of purpose
within the statutory language, there remains unpredictability in the decisions.
51 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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lant Occidental's receipt of an irrevocable right to convert its target
corporation holdings to preference stock of the other party to the
merger nor was the possibility of abuse present in Occidental's granting
an option to purchase the preference shares. As a result, neither the
exchange pursuant to the merger, nor the option contract were found
to be section 16(b) sales.
In the spring of 1967, Occidental determined that it would attempt
an acquisition of the Kern County Land Company (Old Kern) and
unilaterally announced a public tender offer to purchase Old Kern
stock on May 8, 1967. 52 By May 10, enough Old Kern stock had been
tendered to make Occidental a statutory insider under 16(b).
Old Kern resisted Occidental's tender offer and simultaneously
carried on defensive merger talks with several other companies.53 On
May 19, Old Kern accepted an offer to sell its assets to Tenneco, Inc.,54
a multi-faceted Delaware corporation. Realizing that a Tenneco-Old
Kern merger would nullify its attempt to acquire a controlling interest
in Old Kern, Occidental granted Tenneco an option to purchase all
52 450 F.2d at 158. Occidental was convinced that ownership of a large block of Old
Kern stock would be decisive in making the directors of Old Kern amenable to merger or
consolidation proposals. As a preliminary to this end, Occidental purchased a total of
1900 shares of Old Kern stock in late April, 1967. However, since Occidental was not
already, nor did it become, by these purchases, a beneficial owner of more than ten
percent of Old Kern stock, no 16(b) liability was asserted with respect to these shares. 323
F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The terms of the public tender offer published on May 9, 1967 committed Occidental
to purchase all shares tendered up to 500,000 at $83.50 per share, and to pay an additional
$1.50 commission on each share tendered through a broker. Both parties on appeal
accepted the figure of $85 as Occidental's "per share cost of acquisition." The closing price
of Old Kern stock on the New York Stock Exchange was $63,625 per share on the last
trading day before the tender offer was announced. Id. at 574.
Actually, by May 10, 1967, two days after the tender offer announcement, more than
500,000 shares of Old Kern had been tendered. This was enough to make Occidental a
beneficial owner of more than ten percent of Old Kern stock and, as such, a statutory
insider within the provisions of 16(b). On May 11, 1967 Occidental extended its tender
offer to encompass an additional 500,000 shares of Old Kern. As a result of additional
purchases, by June 30, 1967, Occidental owned a total of 887,549 shares. However, Occi-
dental only reported to the SEC ownership of 883,381 shares, its total holdings as of May
31, 1967. 832 F. Supp. at 574.
53 As was noted by the district court, the acquisition of more than ten percent of Old
Kern's stock thrust Occidental Petroleum into an advantageous position vis-A-vis Old
Kern. 323 F, Supp. at 574-75, As the largest stockholder, Occidental Petroleum could force a
showdown with the management which might result in an Occidental takeover. On the
other hand, if Occidental chose to stand pat, it could assert substantial influence in Old
Kern's direction and possibly veto any attempts at a defensive merger. At the very least,
Occidental could offer to divest itself, at a great profit, of its Old Kern stock to either
Old Kern or any company seeking a merger. Needless to say, the directors of Old Kern
faced Occidental's threatening posture with apprehension and determination to resist.
54 450 F.2d at 159. According to the terms of this agreement, in a one to one exchange,
Old Kern stockholders would receive one share of a "new $5.50 preference voting stock
of Tenneco, convertible into 3.6 shares of common stock." 450 F.2d at 159.
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Tenneco shares that Occidental would receive as a result of the merger,
for its holdings of Old Kern stock.55
Occidental, fearful that the defensive merger might result in 16(b)
liability, offered a proposed rule to the SEC that would have exempted
the transaction but it was not accepted.56 Occidental had determined
that, if the SEC did not provide a definitive answer to the question of
16(b) liability, it would "commence every kind of litigation it could
reasonably bring and attempt to stall the consummation of the Ten-
neco [-Old Kern] transaction for six months."5 7 However, this attempt
to delay the merger failed 58 and, after Occidental tendered its Old Kern
shares for Tenneco preference stock on December 11, 1967, New Kern
(the corporation resulting from the merger) sought and obtained sum-
mary judgment for $23,511,837.94 against Occidental in the district
court.5 9
The plaintiff presented two alternative theories to establish a
"sale" within six months of Occidental's purchases which began on
55 Occidental granted Tenneco an option to purchase at $105 per share. Tenneco
paid $10 per share for the call, which was to be credited to the purchase payment upon
exercise of the option. Id. at 159-60. Occidental had reported to its shareholders on May
19, 1967 that the estimated value of the new Tenneco stock was $105. 828 F.Supp. at 575.
GO In order to circumvent its potential liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1984 (see notes 47-49 supra), Occidental presented the SEC with proposed
rule 16(b)-l. This proposed rule was designed to exempt tender offerors faced with a
potentially profitable defensive merger from 16(b) liability.
Although the SEC first indicated a favorable reaction, it refused to publish for
comment Occidental's proposal. After persistent efforts by Occidental, the SEC granted a
formal hearing, held on August 29, 1967, to consider the proposed rule. The result of
this hearing was that the SEC adhered to its earlier decision to abstain. 828 F. Supp. at
577.
The Abrams court refused to draw any inferences from the SEC's nonaction. However,
the court noted the suggestion of appellants counsel that the SEC might have felt the
proposed rule was "inappropriate, since the Williams Bill with respect to tender offers,
now §§ 13(d) and (e) and 14(d), (e) and (f) of the Securities Exchange Act, was pending
before Congress." 450 F.2d at 160 n.7.
57828 F. Supp. at 577.
Seeking to thwart the Tenneco-Old Kern merger, an Old Kern stockholder sued in
a Texas state court and obtained a temporary injunction. When the court order was
dissolved, that plaintiff, joined by his company and several associates, asked for similar
relief in the United States District Courts for the Northern District of California and
the District of Nebraska as well as in another Texas state court. Temporary restraining
orders were granted by both the Nebraska federal court and the Texas state court on
August 22, 1967. However, on the next day, the parties to the proposed merger succeeded in
enjoining continued prosecution of the above suits after instituting an ex parte proceed-
ing before the same Texas state court that had dissolved the original restraining order. Id.
at 577.
58450 F.2d at 161. Occidental also requested that the California Commissioner of
Corporations withhold approval of the merger because it was unfair to Occidental.
However, the Commissioner issued his approval on August 80, 1967 and the ciosing of
the merger plan was held the same day. Id.
59Id. In addition, three stockholder derivative actions were commenced for the
same purpose. These four actions were consolidated.
[Vol. 47:370
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May 8 and ended on June 8. New Kern first contended that, when the
merger was completed on August 30, Occidental actually then sold its
Old Kern shares because it became irrevocably entitled to Tenneco
preference stock. It also argued that, in the alternative, Occidental sold
its Old Kern stock when it granted Tenneco a purchase option on June
2. 0 The Second Circuit, after analyzing these transactions through a
pragmatic method of interpretation 6' rejected both contentions and
60Id. at 161-62.
61 The pragmatic method of interpreting and applying section 16(b) is the result of
an evolutionary process which began approximately nine years after the statute was
enacted. In 1943, the Second Circuit, in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943), was given the opportunity to elect between objective and
pragmatic interpretations of section 16(b). In that case, the defendants contended that
an actual showing of "unfair use of information" proscribed by the statute was an essen-
tial prerequisite to the penalty imposed. The court rejected that contention and opted
for the objective interpretation after reviewing the congressional hearings on section
16(b). Testimony presented in those hearings expressly excluded intent of the wrongdoer
from the elements necessary for liability. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934). The Second
Circuit concluded that 16(b) "liability [is] based upon an objective measure of proof." 136
F.2d at 235.
This mechanistic approach was utilized by the federal courts during the next 15
years. Its potential for injustice was signaled when, in Park & Tilford Inc. v. Schulte, 160
F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), 16(b) liability attached to a sale of
common stock to which preferred stock purchased more than six months previously had
been converted. The Second Circuit, applying the literal or objective test, deemed the
conversion a 16(b) "purchase" of the common stock. Since less than six months had
passed between the conversion and sale, insider abuse was found.
The extension of 16(b) liability to cases involving convertible securities has since
been curbed by rule 16(b)-9 which provides, inter alia:
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security which . . . is convert-
ible ... into another equity security of the same issuer [emphasis added], shall be
exempt from the operation of Section 16(b) . . . Provided, however, that this
section shall not apply to the extent that there shall have been either (1) a
purchase of any equity security of the class convertible . . . and a sale of any
equity security of the class issuable upon conversion, or (2) a sale of any equity
security of the class convertible and any purchase of any equity security issuable
upon conversion... within a period of less than 6 months ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-9 (1972).
At various times between 1952 and 1958 there were indications that the courts were
willing to use a more subjective approach to 16(b) liability. See, e.g., Roberts v. Eaton, 212
F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (reclassification of stock to improve
marketability was not a 16(b) purchase of the reclassified stock); Blau v. Mission Corp.,
212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954) (exchange of stock between corpora-
tion and subsidiary was not a sale prior to creation of a public market for the shares);
Rattner v. Lehman, 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand J. concurring) (recognized possible
insider liability of a company which assigned a partner to care for its interests by
electing him a director of the corporation whose shares were profitably traded).
The modern pragmatic approach requiring a possibility of speculative abuse was
first enunciated by the Sixth Circuit. In Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), after a review of prior cases, the court noted:
Every transaction which can reasonably be defined as a purchase will be so
defined, if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the
speculation encompassed by Section 16(b).
Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the "possibility of speculative abuse" test in Blau v. Max
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reversed the lower court ruling by ordering the entry of summary
judgment for Occidental. First, the court of appeals did not accept the
district court's interpretation of Newmark v. RKO General, Inc.,62
where the Second Circuit held that an exchange pursuant to a merger
may be a sale. The court emphasized that an "indispensable predicate"
for liability in Newmark was the existence of the potential for specula-
tive abuse that inhered in RKO's knowledge of the impending merger
and its power to exert control over the whole transaction. 3 These facts
dearly distinguished Newmark from Abrams where defendant Occi-
dental had no such knowledge or control, thus negating the opportunity
for speculative abuse. In addition to noting Newmark's dictum that an
exchange pursuant to a merger is not per se a 16(b) sale,64 the court also
referred to the "proper criterion"6 5 espoused in Blau v. Lamb66 wherein
a conversion of stock was not deemed a 16(b) purchase. There, the
court noted that the first consideration determinative of whether or not
a transaction constitutes a 16(b) purchase or sale is the potential for
unfair insider trading which 16(b) was enacted to prevent. Speculation,
either actual or potential, was cited as the only abuse at which 16(b)
was directed.67
The court concluded that Occidental's lack of either knowledge of
the impending merger or control of it precluded a possibility of specula-
tive abuse. Therefore, the closing of the Tenneco-Old Kern merger was
not a sale under 16(b).
Appellees' second contention that the June 2 option agreement
invoked 16(b) liability was rejected notwithstanding the statutory defi-
nition of "sale" as inclusive of a "contract to sell."' 8 The Second Cir-
cuit adhered to its pre-established rule which excludes from 16(b) sales
grants of options to purchase stock.69 An exercise of the option, i.e., a
transfer of the shares covered by the option, is a prerequisite to a 16(b)
sale. The court did note that this rule is not inviolable and would not
Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965) and the Second
Circuit finally conformed in Blau v. Lamb, 863 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1002 (1967). Thus, the pragmatic criterion for insider liability was gradually
adopted by the circuits. See Pettys v. Butler, 867 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 885
U.S. 1006 (1967). But see Hell-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 852 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
62 425 F.2d 848 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970).
63 450 F.2d at 163.
64 Id. at 162.
65 Id. at 168.
66 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
OId. at 521.
68 450 F.2d at 164.
69 Id. See Silverman v. Landa, 806 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962).
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be followed when the substance of a sale is disguised in the form of an
option agreement.70
The court noted that two significant factors should control such a
determination: first, whether the down payment is so large in relation
to the price of the option as to preclude, for all practical purposes, its
forfeiture; and, second, whether the price is "below any reasonable
expectation [of the market value] at the end of the option period .... ,,71
However, neither criterion for a coercive option (sale for 16(b) pur-
poses) was met in the instant case.72
To support their contention that an option agreement constitutes
a 16(b) sale, appellees relied on Bershad v. McDonough78 which so held.
In that case, however, the option agreement was a sham. The grant of
purchase rights had been accompanied by a proxy giving the optionee
irrevocable voting control of the stock. Furthermore, immediately fol-
lowing the transaction, the optionor and an associate director had
resigned and were replaced by agents of the optionee. The Second
Circuit found Bershad inapposite by examining substance rather than
form.7 4
In declining to find that execution of the option agreement consti-
tuted a 16(b) sale, the court noted that the result might be otherwise
had Occidental thereby acquired an option to sell after termination of
the statutory six-month period instead of granting an option to buy. A
transaction of the former type would have ensured receipt of an accept-
able price for the shares after the six-month liability period had run.
Also, since exercise of the option would be at Occidental's discretion,
any increase in the market value of the shares over the waiting period
would inure to its added benefit. However, since the transaction in-
volved the grant of a "call" and not the acquisition of a "put" there was
no unconscionable act.7 5 Finding the option agreement to be the logical
solution to a legitimate business problem, the Second Circuit declined
70 450 F.2d at 164.
71 Id.
72 "There was undisputed testimony that the forfeitable down payment, 10.05%o, was
a reasonable, non-coercive price...." Id.
Tenneco argued that its only concern was that it buy out Occidental as a large
minority stockholder. However, the court retorted that the option was a true option
since, although it was true that Tenneco would not feel comfortable while Occidental
controlled a substantial portion of its stock, a depression in the market would likely
preclude the exercise of the option. This result would be dictated by good economic sense
and the threat of stockholder derivative suits for waste.
78428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1970).
74450 F.2d at 165.
75 rd.
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to exercise its acknowledged power to find a sale in a transaction not
normally recognized as such.78
The Abrams decision is consistent with the trend away from a
mechanistic interpretation of section 16(b) toward a more pragmatic
one.7 7 In addition to the potential for injustice inherent in the former
approach, its abandonment may be attributed in part to parallel de-
velopments in state law78 and the expanded role of rule lOb-5.7 9
Possibly the most significant aspect of A brains is its dictum. The
court declared, "indeed, if we considered the question here under dis-
cussion to be closer than we do, we would be seriously concerned over
the policy implications of ruling in appellees' favor."80 The Second
Circuit thus indicated that, should another court disagree with the
"speculative abuse" standard for determining whether an exchange
pursuant to a merger constitutes a 16(b) sale, there are independent
public policy reasons for reaching the same result. These considerations
are twofold. First, a target company would be able to cite as an asset a
tender offeror's potential 16(b) liability and thereby "bait" another
company into a defensive merger. The court felt that it would be
inequitable to so deprive a tender offeror of a share of the profits that
76 Id.
77 See note 61 supra.
78 See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S2d 78
(1969), where it was held that "officers and directors may be held accountable to their
corporation for gains realized by them from transactions in the company's stock as a
result of their use of material inside information." Id. at 496, 248 N.E.2d at 911, 301
N.YS.2d at 79. Defendants contended on appeal that, because federal law may apply, the
state action should be dropped to avoid double liability. The court rejected this conten-
tion, maintaining that federal law had not preempted the field. (It is doubtful if a 16(b)
action could have been brought in this case because defendants held the securities for over
six months.)
By exacting common law liability for trading profits realized outside the six
month period, state common law is operative where section 16(b) is not, since
a period of six months or less is necessary to invoke the federal statute. Similarly,
the Diamond rule is needed where the jurisdictional standards of section 16(b)
cannot be met because the corporation is not subject to the regulatory require-
ments of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Consistently applied, the Diamond
result would supplement section 16(b) liability in these important respects.
Folk, III, Corporation Law Developments-1969, 56 VA. L. REv. 755, 797-98 (1970).
However, reliance on common law principles deprives a plaintiff of the more desirable
16(b) requirements concerning burden of proof and damage determination. Id. at 798.
7D With respect to the dynamic expansion of rule lOb-5, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Exch. Act
Release No. 8,459 (Nov. 25, 1968). See also A. BROMBERG, SEcuRiTiEs LAWs: FRAuD- SEC
RUtLE lOb-5, §§ 2.1-2.3 (1970); Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule l1b-5, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REV.
733 (1971); Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 699
(1971); Macey, Protection of Creditors' Rights Through Use of Rule 10-b5, 76 Com. L.J.
133 (1971); Note "Federal Corporation Law" and 10b-5: The Case for Codification, 45
ST. JoHN's L. R'v. 274 (1970).
80 450 F.2d at 163.
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would not be available but for its initial bid. Second, the incentive to
make tender offers for more than 10 percent of a company's stock
would be seriously diminished since the maker of an unsuccessful take-
over offer might be deprived of any gain by the unilateral maneuvers of
a target corporation. Since tender offers are important means to effect
an appreciation of stock or to replace inefficient management, their
discouragement would be detrimental to stockholders of target corpora-
tions.
It would indeed be anomalous to deprive stockholders of potential
benefit through a mechanistic application of section 16(b) which was
designed to protect such stockholders. The Second Circuit, by recog-
nizing the value of tender offers,81 has avoided this anomaly.
SIPC - A FIRST IMPREsSION
SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc.
Created by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (1970
Act),8 2 the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a non-
profit membership corporation 83 whose fundamental objective is to
provide financial protection for the customers of failing brokers and
dealers (broker-dealers).8 4 SIPC encountered its initial constitutional
challenge in SEC v. Alan F. Hughes, Inc. 5 where the Second Circuit
held that the statutory scheme under which customers of a broker-dealer
are adjudicated to be in need of the protection of the 1970 Act is con-
sistent with due process. The application of the statutory scheme, the
court opined, was proper as evidenced by the record before it.86
All persons registered as broker-dealers under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 193487 and all persons, with certain specified exceptions,88
81 The Second Circuit has previously provided protection for tender offerors. In Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (1969), the court held an investor liable
under sections 9a(2) and 10(b) to a tender offeror whose offer was effectively negated by
defendant's fraudulent manipulation of the price of the target company's stock.
8215 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970).
83 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2). SIPC has all the powers, unless inconsistent with the 1970 Act,
conferred upon a corporation under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act.
Id. § 78ccc(a)(3).
84 1 SIPC ANN. REP. 6 (1971). The term broker-dealer will be used to describe those
brokers and dealers who are registered under section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78o) and those who are members of a national exchange. See Gates,
The Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970: A New Federal Role in Investor Protection,
24 VAND. L. REv. 586 n.2 (1971).
85 461 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
86 Id. at 981.
87 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(a)(2)(B) (1970). Those excepted from the membership require-
ment include persons whose "business as a broker or dealer consists exclusively of (i) the dis-
tribution of shares of registered open end investment companies or unit investment trusts,
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